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The transition to industrial capitalism in mid-nineteenth century Canadil made not only the working-ci1lss, 
but also the bourgeoisie and, in so doing, altered the social meaning of self-employment. Using manuscript census 
schedules, assessment rolls, land records and credit reports, this paper reconstructs the business population of 
Braniford, Ontario, at four cross-sections from 1851 to 1881 to exmnine the role of credit and debt in this change. 
The re-evaluation of the nature of risk after the depression of 1857 tied credit more securely to tangible assets 
and thereby rejected what had been a central tenet of the morality of the commercial economy: the claim of the 
independent, responsible and respectable man to credit on the basis of his character. Rather than the expression 
of independence by the socially mature man, self-employment henceforth necessitated the qualification of in-
dependence through the encumbering of property. 
La transition vers /e capitalisme industriel au Canado, au milieu du XIX• siecle, creait non seulement 
Ia ci1lsse ouvriere, mais aussi Ia bourgeoisie, entrafnant ainsi une modification du sens social du travail inde-
pendont. Le present article, a/' aide de manuscrits de recensements aussi bien que de roles d' evaluation, de 
registres fanciers et de rappons de credit, reconstitue Ia population commen;ante de Brantford, en Ontario, sous 
forme de quatre profils pour /aperiode a/lam de 1851 a 1881, etce dilns le butd'examiner /e role du credit et 
de Ia dette au cours de cette evolution. La reevaluation de Ia nature du risque apres Ia crise de 1857 a eu pour 
effet de lier plus rigoureusement /e credit a des valeurs materielles et d' ecarter ainsi un principe jusqu' alors 
fondilmental de Ia morale de/' economie commerciale : /e droit au credit de/' homme autonome, serieux et res-
pectable selon des criteres de bonnes moeurs. L' acces au travail independont a/lair desormais presuposser que 
le candidat justijie de son autonomie par/' engagement de biens plutot que par Ia simple attestation de sa maturire 
sociale. 
Industrial capitalism in mid-nineteenth century Canada made not only the working 
class, but also the bourgeoisie, and in so doing, it altered the social meaning of self-em-
ployment. With industrialization, and the necessary decline in self-employment associated 
with larger units of production and exchange, to be in business connoted new and different 
qualities of personality, values and social role. Rather than the representation of full maturity 
and independence, as in the culture of the British North American commercial economy, 
a business career carne to identify the exceptional man. In this transition, the credit system 
exercised a significant influence. Not only did the allocation of credit affect the scale and 
opportunities for business, but the criteria of credit worthiness expressed an ideology which 
imposed positive and negative sanctions on behavior. This paper examines the changes 
in the credit system as they affected the ratings and mortgage-secured indebtedne<>s of the 
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businessmen of one mid-nineteenth-century industrializing town, Brantford, Ontario. 
Linking a number of sources -census schedules, municipal tax assessment rolls, abstract 
indexes to land transactions, copy books of deeds, city directories, and credit reports, both 
manuscript and published - has made it possible to outline a collective biography of over 
one thousand men self-employed in 1851-2, 1861, 1871, or 1880-1. 1 
The credit reports on Brantford businessmen assembled by the Mercantile Agency 
ofR.G. Dun and Co. 2 from the late 1840s through the early 1860s expressed an appreciation 
of the ideal of independence through self -employment as the central tenet of the social role 
of the businessman. Men whose self-employment bespoke independence often received 
recommendations for credit by virtue of their character despite their limited wealth or trade 
prospects. The financial collapse of 1857, however, and the ensuing difficulties experienced 
by private and public lenders in recovering loans granted on this kind of intangible security 
promoted a contraction of credit. Indicative of this change was Dun's more extensive re-
porting on the credit worthiness of a larger proportion of the businessmen in Brantford. 
From 1864 the firm issued to its subscribers credit manuals which stressed the primacy of 
only one variable, "pecuniary strength", as the appropriate basis for lending decisions. 
Besides relying on this service, the chartered banks at least from the 1870s employed their 
own credit raters to evaluate assets and liabilities and pursue the business of major industrial 
and commercial borrowers. In essence, then, as more businessmen came under the scrutiny 
of external agencies, self-employment became more narrowly sanctioned by reference to 
wealth, making character a less acceptable criterion. This re-definition affected most ad-
versely the independent commodity producers and the self-employed tradesmen who had 
relied upon skill, maturity and community support for collateral. 
This contraction of credit and the insistence of creditors on more tangible security 
contributed to the increasing value of mortgage debt that accompanied industrialization 
in Brantford in the late 1860s and 1870s. The demand for greater credit or security forced 
businessmen to indenture their real estate, and the assumption of debt, though often nec-
essary for business purposes, represented a qualification to the independence sought in self-
employment. 
Studies of the role of credit in early Canadian industrialization have generally adopted 
a functionalist approach, concentrating upon the institutions and mechanisms which have 
linked production and consumption and the implications that these have had for the flow 
of merchant capital into industrial investment. Such concerns have been most evident in 
the debate provoked by Tom Naylor's contention that Canadian merchants and the financial 
institutions they spawned, preferred short term and relatively safe ventures and thus from 
the 1850s hesitated to invest in longer term, more risky manufacturing enterprises. 3 Gerald 
I. Cross-section years were selected on the basis of the availability of manuscript census schedules 
and assessment rolls for linkage. Both sources are extant for 1861 and 1871. But it was necessary to link the 1851 
assessment to the 1852 census and the 1880 assessment to the 1881 census. The population analyzed at each cross-
section is that identified as being self -employed and present in the census year. 
2. The Mercantile Agency, founded in 1841 by Lewis Tappan of New York, was operated by a suc-
cession of firms until 1859 when Robert G. Dun assumed control. For convenience and because he continued 
to run it until his death in 1900, this paper will refer to the Agency as the Dun Co., despite the inaccuracy of the 
label. See James H. Madison, "The Evolution of Conunercial Credit Reporting Agencies in Nineteenth-Century 
America," Business History Review 47 (1974), pp. 164-86; and Bertram Wyatt-Brown, "God and Dun and 
Bradstreet, 1841-51," Business History Review 4D (1966), pp. 432-50. 
3. Tom Naylor, "The Rise and Fall of the Third Commercial Empire of the St. Lawrence," inCa-
pitalism and the National Question in Canada, ed. Gary Teeple (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), 
pp. 3, 7-8, and The History of Canadian Business (2 vols., Toronto: Lorimer, 1975), I, p. 4. 
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Tulchinsky has explained the separation of commerce and industry in Montreal from 1837 
to 1853 in similar terms, although he has added that the proprietorial form of industrial 
organization may also have deterred mercantile participation. 4 On the other hand, noting 
that this theory of the nature of merchant capital contradicts what has been discovered about 
capital formation in England, Douglas McCalla has maintained that credit from merchants 
provided the very sort of capital - operating capital- most needed by early industrialists 
to bridge the time lag between their purchase of inputs and the sale of their products. 5 
McCalla's own work has astutely noted the ways in which one of the largest mid-
nineteenth-century wholesaling firms in Canada, that of the Buchanan family, performed 
this function. The partners selected their clients on the basis of their evaluation of personal 
character and ability, informed by a prejudice for Scottish or at least British background 
and sustained by occasional meetings and inspections. If at times there seemed caprice in 
the termination of backing- as Michael B. Katz6 has too quickly concluded in explanation 
of the failure of Hamilton's entrepreneurs- it arose from a creditor's recognition that his 
trust had been misplaced or that he was himself overextended. Mercantile credit may have 
been easily obtained, but it was held with difficulty, as the high tum-over in the Buchanans' 
accounts indicated and as the cyclical collapse of the commercial economy revealed. 7 
The resolution of this contradiction in the credit system periodically involved the 
destruction of capital- for example, in 1837, 1847, and, of interest here, in 1857 -along 
with those institutions which acted as intermediaries in its circulation. The demise of the 
two main Ontario banks in the late 1860s, the Commercial Bank and the Bank of Upper 
Canada, discussed by Max Magill and Peter Baskerville respectively, demonstrated the 
risks to capital at the margin of the commercial system where information concerning 
clients' financial positions was obtained with difficulty and was often hypothecated upon 
values inflated with the optimism attending early development. 8 The reduction of capital 
arising from the collapse of 1857, as Breckenridge's and Mcivor's classic surveys of Ca-
nadian financial development suggested, provoked a restructuring of the credit system: not 
only did institutional lending policy become tighter and more directly tied to security, but 
also the legal definition of what could be demanded as collateral security was broadened 
to include bills of lading, and warehouse and other commercial receipts. 9 More recently 
attention has focussed upon the ways in which the court system interpreted the law per-
4. Gerald J.J. Tulchinsky, The River Barons: Montreal Businessmen and the Growth of Industry and 
Transportation, 1837-1853 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), pp. 204-5 . 
5. Douglas McCalla, "Tom Naylor's A History of Canadian Business, 1867-1914," Canadian 
Historical Association, Historical Papers . ( 1976), pp. 249-54; S. Pollard, "Fixed Capital in the Industrial Re-
volution," in Capital Formation in the Industrial Revolution, ed. F. Crouzet (London: Methuen, 1972), pp. 148-
51 ; L.R. McDonald, "Merchants against Industry: An Idea and Its Origins," Canadian Historical Review 56 
(1975), pp. 263-81. 
6. Michael B. Katz, The People of Hamilton, Canoda West: Family and Class in a Mid-Nineteenth-
Century City (Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 1975), p. 201. 
7. Douglas McCalla, The Upper CaTU1lkJ Trade, 1834-1872: A Study of the Buchanans' Business 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press), pp. 38-40, 110, 150-6. Cf. George Bervin, " Apen;u surle commerce 
et le credit a Quebec, 1820-1830," Revue d'histoire de l'Ameriquefranfaise 36 (1983), pp. 527-52. 
8. Max Magill, "The Failure of the Commercial Bank," in To Preserve and Defend: Essays on 
Kingston in the Nineteenth Century, ed. G. Tulchinsky (Montreal: MeGill-Queen's University Press, 1974), 
pp. 169-81; Peter A. Baskerville, "The Pet Bank, the Local State and the Imperial Centre, 1850-1864," Journal 
of Canadian Studies 20 (1985), pp. 22-46. 
9. R.M. Breckenridge, "The Canadian Banking System, 1817-1890," Journal of the Canadian 
Bankers Associntion 2 (1894-5), pp. 431; R. Craig Mcivor, Canadian Monetary, Banking and Fiscal Development 
(Toronto: Macmillan, 1961), pp. 55,69-71. 
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taining to the nature of contract, the allocation of losses, and the procedures of bankruptcy. 
R.C.B. Risk has concluded that in Ontario the judiciary's reluctance to break with existing 
precedents under English common law qualified the significance of legal initiative in 
economic development. 10 Peter George and Philip Sworden have admitted this, but have 
also contended that any body of case law in and of itself clarified the legal framework of 
business. Simple knowledge of how the commercial system was to be interpreted reduced 
transaction costs and thereby improved allocative efficiency. 11 
Concerned with credit as a function , Canadian historians have not directly considered 
the other implication of Naylor's thesis; that is that granting credit was discretionary. It 
necessitated choices and those choices influenced economic structures. Study of the grounds 
upon which choices were made and the implications of these choices involves a study of 
relative access to credit, a social problem, perhaps best approached through a community 
case-study. 
Mid-nineteenth-century Brantford typified those small southern Ontario towns and 
cities in which, according to John McCallum, the mercantile prosperity of the 1850s laid 
the foundation for manufacturing development in the 1870s.12 About twenty-five miles 
from the head of Lake Ontario, Brantford possessed canal and rail connections with Buffalo, 
New York, and its merchants competed with those in Hamilton for control of the western 
Ontario grain trade and for the business of consumers and producers in the rural districts. 
1be collapse of the commercial economy in 1857 bankrupted many of the town's merchants 
who were overextended by speculations in the grain, lumber and land markets. In the au-
tumn of 1857 creditors rushed into the Brant County Court in attempts to recover their 
losses. Three hundred and sixty-seven judgements for overdue debts, more than twice as 
many as in all of 1856, were registered in County Court against Brantford businessmen. 
The biggest loser was the Toronto private banker, E.F. Whittemore, who registered 
judgements of over $100,000 against local businessmen, while the chartered banks suffered 
losses totalling $125,000 on Brantford business paper. 13 On one day alone, 3 March 1858, 
the court issued 130 summons against people unable to satisfy judgements against them. 14 
Suits from creditors seeking attachments of goods and mortgage foreclosures clogged the 
County Court of Chancety and local newspapers regularly noted sheriff's sales of property 
seized by court order. 
From the late fifties through the early sixties, Brantford languished. Its population, 
which had swelled from 2250 in 1848 to 7266 in 1858, dropped to 6251 in 1861. Indus-
trialization in the 1870s brought recovery. Employment mainly in the metal fabricating 
10. R.C.B. Risk, "The Nineteenth Century Foundations of the Business Corporation in Ontario," 
University of Toronto Law Journal23 (1973), pp. 270-306; " The Golden Age: The Law about the Marlcet in 
Nineteenth-Century Ontario," Ibid. 26 (1976), pp. 307-46; "The Last Golden Age: Property and the Allocation 
of Losses in Ontario in the Nineteenth Century," Ibid. 27 (1977), pp. 199-239; "The Law and the Economy 
in Mid-Nineteenth Century Ontario," Ibid. 27 (1977), pp. 403-38. 
II. Peter George and Philip Sworden, " The Courts and the Development ofTrade in Upper Canada, 
1830-1860," Business History Review 60 (1986), pp. 280. 
12. John McCallum, Unequal Beginnings: Agriculture and Economic Development in Quebec and 
Ontario until1870 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press , 1980), pp. 55, 87-90; James M. Gilmour, Spatial 
Evolution of Manufacturing in Southern Ontario, 1851-1891 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972). 
13. Archives of Ontario [hereafter cited as AO], RG 22, County Court Records , Brant County, Register 
of Judgements, 1853-8. 
14. Public Archives of Canada [hereafter cited as PAC], W.C. Good Papers, vol. 25, LetteJbook 1856-
61 , Allen Good to[?], 4 Mar. 1858. 
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industry- in the Grand Trunk Railway Car Shops, the Waterous Engine and Machine 
Works, two agricultural implement factories and two foundries- as well as in a cotton 
mill, a woollen mill, a starch factory and several smaller carriage factories, supported the 
city's population of lO 555 in 1881. As the Brantford Expositor explained, manufacturing 
was ''about the only avenue that pays substantial interests on investments.'' 15 In conse-
quence the city's business community was restructured: the rate of self-employment de-
clined by about forty per cent, from one in four males over the age of sixteen in 1861 to 
one in seven in 1881. Not only was starting a business more difficult, so too was staying 
in business. Whereas one half of new businesses failed in less than ten years in the 1850s, 
two thirds did so in the l870s. 16 More limited access to credit contributed to these changes. 
Credit made the economy run and businessmen were dependent upon it. A busi-
nessman held much of his wealth in trust, which, in turn, depended on the good opinion, 
confidence and esteem of his associates. Should a man lose that confidence and be pressed 
to settle his affairs, his wealth might quickly collapse, since only with time could he realize 
the full value of the accounts of customers to whom he himself had extended credit. The 
credit system of the commercial economy, as described by the Cashier of the Bank of Upper 
Canada, recognized the right of "every farmer or person in trade or in respectable cir-
cumstances, who can give unexceptional personal security, to secure from the public banks 
reasonable accommodation.'' 17 Credit was the prerogative of the respectable and responsible 
man; its purpose was not a matter of great concern to the lender since an honourable bor-
rower fulfilled his obligations. The ideal of this code of honour was well stated in 1857 in 
the Canadinn Merchants Magazine and Commercial Review, no doubt as a reminder to 
debtors tempted to abscond: 18 
The true merchant is but the true man, illustrating a particular condition in life .. .. The ethics and 
moralities, prevailing in , and governing all other relations, should be those which suggest his 
mercantile life and conduct. He should have no rule of right and wrong for the social circle and 
drawing room, and another for the counting house and busy marts of trade .... His promises ring 
out like true gold - contracts are never violated - his drafts are never dishonoured - he needs 
no endorser .... His bank is integrity and his bank book shows always a large credit side to his 
account. He values equities above legalities, and moralities above advantages. He looks the sheriff 
and the constable full in the face , like an honest man; and lawyers and agencies he never invokes. 
Credit, then, was related to the businessman's conformity to a role model that stressed 
qualities of character and personality. 
The agents, both local and itinerant, retained by the Mercantile Agency to report on 
Brantford business, expressed this personal approach to credit in the 1840s and 1850s. A 
man's wealth determined the amount of credit he might receive. But his character deter-
mined whether or not he would receive any credit. Though wealthy, a man lacking in 
character was a poor risk. For example, potential creditors of one of Brantford's wealthiest 
general merchants, a "rather sharp and unscrupulous [man] ... who will make money by 
hook or by crook'', were forewarned in 1854 that ''his word is of no moment or importance 
to him, if the observance of it stood between him and gain.'' Consequently lenders were 
15. Brantford Expositor, 26 Aug. 1881. 
16. David G. Burley, "The Businessmen of Brantford, Ontario: Self-Employment in a Mid-Nineteenth 
Century Town" (Ph.D. Dissertation, McMaster University, 1983), pp. 136, 145,322. 
17. R.J. Burns, "Ridout, Thomas Gibbs," Dictionary ofCanodiim Biography. Vol. IX: 1861 to 1870 
(Toronto: University ofToronto Press, 1976), pp. 661-2; Magill, "Commercial Bank," p. 178. 
18. Canadian Merchnnts Magazine and Commercial Review, 2(0ct. 1857-Mar. 1858), p. 911 . 
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advised to have little to do with this poor risk. 19 On the other hand, a bookseller, " honest 
as the day is long,'' but who, the reporter admitted, would ''never make more than a liv-
ing ... [ since he] unfortunately can't get on in business,' ' was considered deserving of a good 
credit rating as encouragement. 20 
Those who conformed to the image of the ideal businessmen - an independent, 
respectable, responsible family man who was determined to succeed- impressed creditors. 
The independent businessman did not seek credit lightly, since to assume indebtedness, 
even for trade purposes, compromised his freedom and independence of action. Thus, it 
was a compliment for businessmen's credit ratings to declare that "he would ask no credit 
he may not be entitled to" or that he "always pays up like a man" or that he is "good for 
all he would ask''. 21 Of course, a man had to be respectable and of good character to be 
credited, or rather, if of bad character a man found great difficulty in obtaining credit. 
Comments on the honesty, industry and decency of businessmen were so frequent in the 
credit reports that they became cliches. One simply expected a businessman to deal fairly; 
thus, it was not honourable actions that impressed, but dishonourable ones. A man taking 
advantage of his partner, breaking a business contract, betting on horses, speculating, 
gambling, cutting prices ruinously or simply having "not much heart" received a qualified 
credit rating. 22 So did a man ''too fond of the glass'', even if he took the pledge. 23 Yet, 
ethnic stereotypes might mitigate the stigma. Thus, for an Irish Catholic or a German the 
consumption of intoxicants was considered part of his life style. The German grocer who 
"eats, drinks and sleeps at a great rate" was just a colourful local character, as was the 
Irish Catholic grocer "who gets on a spree once in a long while which sharpens his wits. " 24 
A businessman might be independent and his character above suspicion, but if he 
had "no responsibility'', then he was a poor risk. 25 Responsibility was for the mid-Victorian 
more than mere accountability for one's actions and behavior. It was something quite 
tangible and included those things to which the mid-Victorian man was most passionately 
committed, his property and his family. Real estate holdings demonstrated to creditors that 
a businessman had made a commitment to a town. He was not "in a position so that he 
could take up his traps and leave at five minutes notice." 26 
A family and a wholesome family life were probably the most important factors in 
establishing a man's responsibility and his worthiness of credit. A single man, it was felt, 
lacked the order in his life of a married man and father and had less reason to be ambitious. 27 
A family man who did not live up to his obligations was morally reprehensible. The Dun 
credit reporter was shocked and disgusted by a general merchant who "has left for British 
Columbia and left nothing here but his wife and three children." 28 If a man would not fulfill 
his responsibilities as a family man, he was certainly not to be trusted with credit. 
I 9. Baker Library, Harvard University, Dun and Bradstreet, Credit Ledgers, Brant County L hereafter 
cited as DUN], p. 45 . 
20. DUN, pp. 52C, 52D, 52H, 52F, 75, 119. 
21. DUN,pp. 37,48,67, 82,82'2, 119. 
22. DUN, pp. 45, 52D, 67 ,821. 
23. DUN, pp. 46, 97, 134, 82'0. 
24. DUN, pp. 47, 49, 136. 
25. DUN, pp. 52A, 52D, 58, 73 . 
26. DUN, pp. 52L. 
27. DUN, pp. 52'0. 
28. DUN, pp. 84. 
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A man's family, were it not organized and disciplined properly, could prove a dis-
advantage in establishing good credit. Failure to maintain family discipline raised doubts 
concerning a man's ability as head of the household and might occasion gossip that an 
extravagant wife or wild sons were a drain on the profits of the business. 29 Creditors were 
even wary of a man with a family too large which might gobble up all the fruits of his en-
deavours. 30 Preferable was a man with a small family, such as the "Scotch, stingy, close, 
hardworking" saddler whose "whole family expenses cannot possibly be over $35 or $40 
per annum, unless oatmeal should rise and his cow die. " 31 These, then, were the char-
acteristics which influenced the decisions of potential creditors. A businessman ought to 
be honest, moral, hardworking, committed to independence and vested with responsi-
bilities. Such a man had too much to lose should he fail to meet his obligations. 
The frequent complaints against the favouritism of bank accommodation policy 
would seem to controvert the even-handedness of a credit system based on evaluations of 
character. 32 Easy access to credit for the self -employed artisan and small businessman was 
not necessarily incompatible with bitter infighting and discrimination among major mer-
chants and financiers . Rather this contradiction was symptomatic of the bifurcation of the 
economy of the commercial city and the overlapping dualities of the inward/outward 
perspectives and engagements of merchants and of the at times divergent interests of artisans 
and merchants. Different though these two components were, mercantile enterprise and 
petty enterprise did impinge one upon the other. As T. W. Acheson has noted in his study 
of Saint John, N.B., the acceptance of mercantilism by artisans depended upon their per-
ception of benefits in the promotion of mercantile enterprise. 33 1t was in the interests of 
merchants to promote this artisanal acquiescence to their leadership of the commercial 
economy. The implementation by merchants of what essentially was a credit standard of 
petty enterprise ought to be seen in this light. 
The petty enterprise of artisans and shopkeepers who obtained most of their stock 
and credit locally comprised the largest part of Brantford' s business community from the 
1830s to the mid-1860s. To them, being in business asserted their social maturity, their 
independence, rather than revealed any commercial acumen. That so many achieved in-
dependence in Brantford was remarkable, for in 1852 and 1861 one third of all men in their 
thirties and two fifths of those in their forties were self -employed. Their operations were 
small in most instances. Nearly two thirds of those engaged in the production of goods in 
1861, for example, reported to the census enumerator that they employed no labour. 34 Still 
such businesses satisfied much of local consumption by producing basic commodities and 
retailing what they could not produce. Some did venture the twenty-five or so miles to 
Hamilton and a few did go as far as Toronto or Buffalo to procure some items. But these 
excursions were limited and suspicions could be provoked by the small timer wandering 
too far from home. 35 
29. DUN, pp. 49, 51 , 53, 68, 82. 
30. DUN, p. 56. 
31. DUN, p. 82. 
32. An infonnative study of one example of unwarranted favoritism is Peter Baskerville, "Donald 
Bethune's Steamboat Business: A Study of Upper Canadian Commercial and Financial Practice,'' Ontario History 
67 (1975), pp. 135-50. 
33. T.W. Acheson, Saint Jolm: The Making of a Colonial Aristocracy (foronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1985), pp. 57-8 . 
34. Burley, pp. 104, 184, 186. 
35. DUN, pp. 52D, 58, 70, 91. 
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In crediting petty enterprises merchants and even bank managers in the 1840s and 
1850s demonstrated a generosity within their community that they themselves might not 
have enjoyed. General merchants and purveyors of alcohol willingly supported "low 
grocers" with no security. Some employers helped set up employees in business, at times 
as competitors. 36 The local banks too could act favourably to tradesmen of laudable 
character. About two German tanners, Dun's agent remarked in 1861 : " although their 
capital is small, [they] are treated liberally on account of their character and industry [and 
they] are well thought of by the local banks. " In another act of generosity, the Bank of 
Montreal's agent backed a former labourer in opening a general store. 37 
To have friends was important, but connections did not necessarily distinguish a man. 
Many, if not most, small operators appear to have been so favoured. If they did not have 
a sympathetic employer or acquaintance in business, co-religionists might offer encour-
agement. 38 Valuable friends in deed to members of Farringdon Church, an Independent 
Methodist sect, were James and Ignatius Cockshutt, from the 1840s the wealthiest mer-
chants in Brantford. One beneficiary, Thomas Cowherd, the Tinsmith Rhymer, expressed 
his gratitude in his own peculiar verse: 39 
TO MR. JAMES C T. 
NOVEMBER, 1853. 
"A friend in need's a friend indeed" 
0 , can I look back to the time of my need, 
When thou, under God, prov'dst a kind friend indeed, 
And feel no emotion my bosom to swell? 
'Twere baseness of conduct too shocking to tell. 
Time was when chill penury stared in my face, 
And I was made feel it almost a disgrace. 
As a fruit of thy kindness that time has gone by, 
So I to be thankful would constantly try. 
0, well I remember how often I thought 
My business endeavours would all come to naught; 
That I, 'midst my toiling should surely stick fast, 
And most sad disappointment meet me at last. 
The Lord sent thee to me at such time of trial, 
When exercised well with the grace of Self-denial. 
Thy kind way of speaking took from me my sadness, 
And left in its place a rich increase in gladness. 
36. DUN, pp. 69, 91, 108, Ill . Cf. Anthony F.C. Wallace, Rockdille: The Growth of an American 
Village in the Early Industrial Revolution (New York: Knopf, 1978), pp. 51, 55, 412; and Oyde and Sally Griffen, 
Natives and Newcomers, p. 35. 
37. DUN, p. 50, 52, 106. 
38. DUN, p. 52C, 99. 
39. Mary B. Stedman, Farringdon Church: Its History and Background from /830 to 1877 (Brantford: 
n.p. , 1977), pp. 3-13; Thomas Cowherd, The Emigrant Mechanic and Other Tales in Verse by ... the Brantford 
Tinsmith Rhymer (Jackson, Mich.: Daily Citizen Book and Job Printing House, 1884), p. 253 . 
CREDIT AND DEBT IN THE TRANSillON TO INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM 87 
And oft since that time through a much chequered life 
Amidst this world's bustle, its turmoil and strife, 
My mind has been solaced with thoughts of thy love, 
Which does thy relation to Christ clearly prove. 
May thy good example to those that remain, 
Be useful in showing Religion is gain. 
Though Cowherd's poetic genius may not have done justice to his sincerity, his verse 
does eloquently attest to his self-denial and the burden he felt from not getting ahead. But 
more significantly he explained Cockshutt's help not as a favour but as the act of true 
Christian friendship. His example also affirmed a central tenet of the moral economy of 
petty enterprise: as Dun's agent put it about another, " By the assistance of Friends, [he 
has] got a small stock'' 40. Knowledge of someone' s good character conferred an obligation 
upon its holder to respect and, if possible, to advance his independence. To the Victorian 
artisan, as Geoffrey Crossick has observed, "independence, self-goverru;nent and self-
reliance were theoretically attainable by all" within a society of one's equals. 41 
Fraternalism distinguished petty enterprise from the moral economy of eighteenth-
century paternalism that E.P. Thompson has examined. In fact patronage and the ap-
pearance of being patronized was deeply resented by those who interpreted its acceptance 
as compromise of their independence. 42 A reluctance to be beholding to another imposed 
a limit upon the line of credit a small proprietor might seek. Dun's reporter took this into 
account when recommending two tanners for "any amount they would ask for as I don't 
think they like being in debt." Similarly although one cabinet maker was deemed a good 
risk for $600 in 1858, the investigator doubted whether the ''close-fisted Scotchman ... will 
ever have courage to ask for more than $50 credit or buy more than that amount of goods 
at one time.'' 43 The debts assumed and the credits extended in this moral economy often 
amounted to little individually: less than $500 generally was suggested by Dun for the lowest 
category of subjects. Yet a few dollars, a few days more could mean the difference between 
continuing business and closing shop. 
A rating from Dun tended to affect such men only if their horizons broadened. By 
definition, unless they stood low in local opinion, they would have been unlikely to seek 
much credit from the sorts of American firms that used Dun's service in the 1850s. 
Brantford's transportation links with Buffalo did however present temptation to touch 
American lenders. Dun's representatives often received requests to check certain names, 
presumably men who had approached one of their clients. Numerous entries simply give 
the name and occupation of a subject followed by the lone comment: "Can't find out about 
them"; "No such firm here"; "Questionable!!" Or, when the reporter became suspicious, 
he communicated his concern: for example, in 1858 about two tavern keepers, "fearing 
40. DUN, p. 521. 
41. G. Crossick, An Artisan Elite in Victorian Society: Kentish London, 1840-1880 (London: Croom 
Helm, 1978), pp. 144, 156. Cf. Paul Faler, "Cultural Aspects of the Industrial Revolution: Lynn, Mass ., 
Shoemakers and Industrial Morality, 1830-1860," Labor History 15 (1974), p. 388. 
E.P. Thompson, "The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century," Past and 
Present 50 (1971): 83~; Bryan D. Palmer, " Kingston Mechanics and the Rise of the Penitentiary, 1833-1836," 
Histoire sociale-·Social History 8 (May 1980), p . 26-7; Robert Q. Gray, The Labour Aristocracy in Victorian 
Edinburgh (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), pp. 90, 146. 
43. DUN, p. 70, 101. 
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they might trouble some of the NY merchants, we advise you of their position.'' 44 For the 
artisan and shopkeeper, a rating probably had more effect when it recommended against 
credit. 
In this role, Dun's advice seems to have been fairly reliable. Studying the evaluation 
of fifty-one of the Hamilton's elite, however, Michael Katz was impressed by the sudden 
tum of fortune and by the lack of warning of failure in their credit ratings. 45 The Brantford 
ledger reveals a similar predictive weakness for the town's largest merchants, but had Katz 
studied all the ratings, he may have found that, as in Brantford, sounder counsel was 
available concerning self-employed artisans. In the ninety-three instances of failure ex-
plicitly mentioned between 1850 and 1870, warning of impending difficulties in the form 
of a recommendation against credit or exposure of serious business problems was provided 
one year in advance in about fifty per cent of the cases. 46 (Table 1) 
Table 1 Reliability ofR.G. Dun and Co.'s Credit Reports, 1850-1870 (N of Cases) 
Warning Given of Impending Failure 
I Year Less than None 
Ahead I Year 
Merchants• . ..... . . . . II 4 19 
Petty Shopkeepers b • • . • 10 5 5 
Manufacturers' ..... . . 6 2 
Artisans .. . . ... . .. . . . 20 2 9 
Total .. .. . . . . . 47 II 35 
a Includes hotel keepers. 
b Includes saloon and tavern keepers . 
c Includes millers, builders and planing mill owners. 
Total 
34 
20 
8 
31 
93 
Unexpected failure proved that character was less effective in allocating credit within 
mercantile enterprise because of more entangling credit relationships beyond the com-
munity. Three groups of merchants can be defined in accordance with the role of character 
in these relations. First those support houses which received the stock from a single 
wholesaler generally possessed slight capital and depended entirely upon their supplier. 
In selecting men to support, wholesalers undoubtedly preferred those whom they knew 
at first hand and might therefore trust at a distance. For this reason a number picked their 
clerks, deeming knowledge of ability and character more important than capital. While 
acknowledging their character, Dun's representative tied their ratings to the reputation of 
their backers- "unsafe alone" . Support houses, even when conducting a profitable 
business failed suddenly, should their suppliers encounter trouble. Anticipating such a 
problem, a retailer might approach some new wholesaler on the basis of the health of his 
44. DUN, pp. 52C, 91 , 106. 
45. Katz, The People of Hamilton , C{l/1{1(/n West (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975), 
pp. 199, 201 , 202-3 . 
46. This analysis has employed a very limited and legalistic definition of failure to include insolvency, 
assignment of assets for the benefit of creditors, court seizure of assets, court judgements ordering payment of 
overdue noles, and absconding. Most failures, however, occurred quietly as a man honourably absorbed his losses 
and quietly closed his shop door. 
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operation without indicating the extent of his obligations to his original backer. 47 Dun 
warned against this. 
A second and probably the largest category of mercantile enterprise included those 
merchants whose capital was sufficient to allow them either to pay cash or to offer security. 
Their metropolitan connections were limited to specific transactions and, though they might 
deal with only one or two wholesalers, they could shop around for the best terms. Risk 
arose from dealing with a firm prepared to oversell the mruket by supplying whoever wished 
to buy. The grocery trade, in which margins were small and profits depended upon volume, 
suffered from this and accounted for the largest number of failures in a single trade, nineteen, 
noted by Dun. Knowledge of character helped a creditor anticipate debtor behavior. 
Merchants did seek protection by contriving the priority of claims of friends to whom they 
could then assign their assets should difficulties arise. 48 Both wealth and character then 
interested potential lenders: the former assured that a man in this category could pay, the 
latter that he would. 
Most of the unanticipated failures in the 1850s and 1860s fell among the ranks of 
the third group, the wealthiest merchants who possessed extensive interests and connections. 
They relied upon multiple metropolitan suppliers and brokers, the chartered banks and each 
other for credit, and they complained when it was not forthcoming to the extent that they 
sought. 49 Nevertheless the wealthiest were credited most extensively and unwisely in the 
halcyon years before 1857. Somewhat different standards measured their character than 
were applied to more plodding businessmen. Boosters might have seemed ' 'rather sanguine 
and speculative'' , but their vision and enthusiasm, as well as their extensive participation 
in the town's economy blinded Dun's reporter as thoroughly as the chartered banks to the 
susceptibility of their interests and assets to cyclical devaluation. 
Unrivalled in ambition and in the confidence of lenders was George Samuel Wilkes. 
From the late forties through the fifties, Wilkes immersed himself in nearly every oppor-
tunity presented by the commercial economy: wholesaling and forwarding, flour milling 
and grain speculating, rail promotion, iron founding, newspaper publishing and real estate 
speculating. His reputation as a "good man of business" and his and his family's extensive 
land holdings stood him in good stead with lenders, Dun's opinion being "entitled to any 
credit he may require.'' 50 At one time able to pass and repay an unendorsed promissory 
note for $48,000, in 1857 he defaulted on notes and endorsations to the sum of $238,674 
-about ten per cent due to the banks- and mortgages for $83,380. The 141 court 
judgements registered against him for non-payment of notes demonstrate that, while en-
dorsations may have been provided somewhat too freely , a degree of reciprocity was ex-
pected. The endorsee, in exchange for having his note co-signed, either co-signed a note 
for his endorsor or gave a note indebting himself to his endorsor. Neither offered much 
protection to someone mixed up with Wilkes, but the choice of protection revealed 
something about credit/debt relations in the bifurcated commercial economy. P.C. 
VanBrocklin, railroad promoter and steam engine and car manufacturer- a "fast man" 
in his own right - typified the strategy of other prominent businessmen in demanding 
security for co-signing. Notes from Wilkes for $27,000 offset VanBrocklin's obligations 
47 . DUN, pp. 65, 78, 82, 94, 102, 112. 
48. DUN, pp. 50, 54, 62, 69, 82 II" , 82 3/", 112. Cf. Gaetan Gervais, " Le commerce de detail au 
Canada (1870-1880)," Revue histoire de I' Amerique fram;aise 33 (mars 1980), pp. 523, 525 , 533, 539. 
49. E.g. , Good Papers, vol. 25 , Letterbook 1856-61, Allen Good to James Coleman, 20 Dec. 1856. 
50. DUN, p. 57 . 
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of $44,500 as an endorsor. On the other hand, William Lines, the labourer assisted as 
general merchant by the Bank of Montreal, received no notes from Wilkes, but in return 
for backing $6100 of debts had Wilkes co-sign for $1657. Similarly John M. Tupper, a 
successful carriage maker, endorsed for $14,500, while Wilkes reciprocated with $2100 
in endorsations. Lines and Tupper, men who had risen from petty enterprise, acted in a 
way appropriate to that moral economy. They could trust Wilkes, just as he could trust them 
to make good on their paper. Those engaged in mercantile enterprise wanted more security. 
In hindsight, to hold a Wilkes' note was to hold little, but it still was an asset. 
One last pattern was evident in the debt of George S. Wilkes. Among his liabilities 
were a number of notes which he had endorsed for men with whom he had no business 
or personal connection: $120 for a self -employed painter; $116 for a bookseller; $508 for 
a small grocer to buy stock locally; $528 for a tavern keeper for liquor from a Brantford 
distiller. 51 To him such transactions were insignificant. But Wilkes' action implicitly ac-
cepted the moral economy and recognized that his own ventures, like those of other 
boosters, rested in part upon the political confidence that small proprietors had in men of 
his sort to run the affairs of the town. The ability of Mayor Wilkes to pledge municipal 
credit to promote railroads, navigation improvements or the gas company depended upon 
the perception of artisans and shopkeepers as voters that mercantile enterprise promoted 
petty enterprise. 
With the collapse of the commercial economy, acceptance of a credit system founded 
on intangibles was a luxury and greater use was made of the credit rating service provided 
by the R.G. Dun and Co. From 1864 the agency published a quarterly register of credit 
ratings of businessmen in British North America for the use of their subscribers, who in-
cluded Canadian wholesalers as well as the chartered banks themselves. 52 This sped up 
credit investigations, since no longer did potential creditors have to telegraph for an eval-
uation. As well, the chartered banks thew.selves hired credit reporters to investigate and 
recruit major accounts. 
More intense scrutiny by the Mercantile Agency presented a moral dilemma to the 
Monetary Times ofToronto:53 
On the one hand, to legalize these institutions .. .is placing one portion of the mercantile community 
under an organized system of espionage and inquisition for the benefit of the other; and, on the 
other, to refuse to legalize them may be restricting injuriously the right of enquiring into the 
character and standing of the customer asking for credit in his business transactions. 
In the journal's opinion, the issue opposed two conceptions of the proper relationship be-
tween creditor and debtor: an older one in which the lender himself judged "character and 
standing" and a new and impersonal one mediated by spies who separated the business 
community. In the end, the Monetary Times concluded that new conditions making it 
impossible for a lender to obtain knowledge independently justified the use of some 
intermediary. 
The Dun ledger does reveal an improvement in the quality of information available 
to the firm's clients, in particular precise accounts of business assets and liabilities. Re-
51. Brant County, Register of Judgements, 1853-8. 
52. Copies of the published credit manuals bear the imprint of the Bank of Montreal and of the Brantford 
saddlery and harness manufacturers, Smith, McKay and Co. Cf. McCalla, Upper Canada Trade , p. 112; Madison, 
"Credit Reporting Agencies," pp. 171-3. 
53 . Monetary Times, 240ct. 1867. 
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cognizing the importance of their rating, Brantford businessmen appear to have provided 
the reporter with financial statements from the late 1860s and to have protested when they 
believed they had been unfairly evaluated. Such complaints were met with requests for 
detailed statements and reluctance to comply raised suspicions. 54 The subjects themselves 
changed the role of the credit reporter from spy to agent: whereas the first raters were 
cautioned to remain anonymous, potential borrowers who wanted to be known would not 
allow later ones to remain so. 55 
In consequence, Dun's credit reporting on Brantford's businessmen became more 
detailed following the depression of 1857. Whereas only forty businessmen ( 17 per cent 
of all) had established ratings in 1851-2, 155 (44 percent of all) had done so by 1861. During 
this decade, coverage was extended beyond the major businessmen -loosely defined as 
the wealthiest twenty per cent of the business population- who had previously attracted 
the most attention. Included were more of those in the lower percentile ranges of the dis-
tribution of wealth. (fable 2) As well greater attention was paid to independent commodity 
producers in all trades. For example, only one shoemaker received a rating in 1851; ten 
of sixteen did in 1861. No tailors or cabinet makers were reported in 1851; four of each 
were in 1861. The concentration on these groups suggested a re-evaluation of the locus 
of risk in the economy. Over the ensuing twenty years this pattern persisted as coverage 
became more complete, reporting on 250 businessmen (67 per cent of all) in 1871 and 371 
(93 per cent of all) in 1881. Moreover, by 1881 credit ratings had become more clearly 
related to wealth. Since Dun's reporter pronounced a judgement which was not merely 
positive or negative but graded, the ratings can be quantified and treated as a ranked order: 
no good or poor, fair, and good. The meaning of the middle rank remained constant through 
this period. It indicated one of two things: either a man's business was respectable but 
modest in scale and he was entitled to only "reasonable" credit, or he was experiencing 
difficulties which could be resolved with the careful forbearance of creditors. 
Table2 Per Cent of Businessmen in Each Economic Rank 
Receiving Credit Ratings, 1851-1881 
Economic Rank 1851-2 1861 1871 1880-1 
0-39 percentile 12.0 40.2 53.4 64.6 
40-79 13.0 46.5 56.8 66.9 
80-89 42.1 68 .9 88.2 86.8 
90-100 65.0 83 .9 85.7 86.8 
Source: AO, RG 17, Brantford Assessment Rolls , 1851 , 1861 , 1871, 1880; Baker Library, Harvard University, 
Dun and Bradstreet, Credit Ledgers, Brant County ; Reference Book for the Dominion of Canada ... (Toronto, 
Montreal, Halifax: The Mercantile Agency, 1871, 1881). 
Note : The methodology employed in calculating percentile rankings of wealth from the assessment rolls is de-
scribed in Burley, "Businessmen of Brantford," p. 396. 
Re-definition altered the meaning of the other two ratings. In the 1850s a "no good" 
or ''poor'' rating identified those whose character was suspect even if they were wealthy, 
who possessed no responsibility, or who were newcomers and relatively unknown. None 
54. DUN, pp. 82 3/", 100, 121 , 123, 126, 141. 
55. D.A. Muise, "The Dun and Bradstreet Collection: A Report," Urban History Review 3-75 (Feb. 
1976), pp. 23-6. 
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the less, it was not unknown for the poorest ofBrantford's businessmen to receive a "good" 
rating. In 1851 one third of the ratings given to those in the poorest forty percent were 
' 'good'', an approval rate that exceeded that of the next wealthiest forty per cent. (Table 
3) A small businessman's self-control, self-knowledge and realistic evaluation of his 
prospects might inspire the same confidence and credit rating as that given to a more wealthy 
man. Time, however, diminished the likelihood of a favourable report for the least wealthy. 
Table3 Credit Ratings by Economic Rank, 1851-1881 (in per cent) 
Year Economic Rank Credit Rating 
No Good/ Fair Good 
Poor 
1851-2 0-39 percentile .. . . 55.6 II. I 33.3 
40-79 ........ . .. 70.0 30.0 
80-89 .. .. .. ... .. 25.0 12.5 62.5 
90-100 . .... .. . .. 15.4 23 .1 61.5 
All ........ 40.0 12.5 47.5 
1861 0-39 percentile . .. . 78.1 5.9 16.0 
40-79 ... .. ... . . . 59.1 18 .2 22.7 
80-89 .. . ..... ... 31.8 50.0 18.2 
90-100 .......... 19.2 19.2 61.6 
All ...... .. 53.5 19.4 27.0 
1871 0-39 perecentile . . . 61.4 38.6 
40-79 .. . ...... . . 25.6 56.5 17.9 
80-89 .. .... ... .. 9.4 31.2 59.4 
90-100 .......... 25 .9 74.1 
All .. .... .. 33.6 42.3 24.1 
1880-1 0-39 percentile . . . . 54.1 45 .3 0.6 
40-79 ..... .... .. 13.0 69.6 17.4 
80-89 ... . ...... . 11.4 34.3 54.3 
90-100 ...... .. . . 11.1 11.1 77.8 
All .. ...... 31.6 48 .7 19.7 
The expansion of reporting in the 1860s acted to the detriment of the least wealthy 
rank of businessmen and was probably, in part, an effort to warn potential creditors about 
men who in time of economic adversity might attempt to search farther afield for credit 
support. Only half as many in the poorest rank received a ''good'' rating in 1861 as in 1851 
and nearly eighty per cent were considered a poor risk. The message was clear: doing 
business with a man possessing little capital was dangerous in 1861. For that matter, the 
credit reporter did not think highly of business prospects in general in Brantford in the 
aftermath of the crash of 1857. More than half of the business community were given 
"poor" ratings in 1861. "Good" ratings dropped from forty-seven per cent in 1851 to 
twenty-seven per cent in 1861 . Even a sizable proportion of the wealthiest twenty per cent 
were considered questionable. Nearly a third of businessmen in the eighty to eighty-ninth 
percentile received a "poor" rating, while fewer, under twenty per cent, were judged 
"good" in 1861, compared with more than sixty per cent ten years before. 
Overall Brantford business was more favourably evaluated in 1871. Nevertheless, 
the wealthy were clearly divided from those men of limited means. In fact the revival of 
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lender confidence in Brantford did not extend to the latter businessmen: between fifty and 
sixty per cent of the least wealthy forty per cent were deemed unworthy of a positive report; 
none in 1871 and less than one per cent in 1881 of that rank were recommended as good 
risks in 1881 . On the other hand, about three quarters of the wealthiest ten per cent of the 
business community were rated ''good'' . 
Another feature of the re-evaluation of risk involved more frequent comments about 
trade prospects, especially the poor outlook for artisans. The shoemaking trade, for ex-
ample, was overdone, according to the reports in the 1860s: " Some must go shortly .. .! 
don't believe that half the shoemakers are paying expenses," wrote Dun's reporter. 56 The 
more intensive credit reporting through the 1850s resulted in a dramatic increase in the 
number of tradesmen who were deemed unworthy of credit: whereas less than one-quarter 
of those self-employed in industrial production received a "poor" rating in 1851, more 
than one half suffered this evaluation in 1861, an opinion that did not improve in 1871 or 
1881 . On the other hand, the risk associated with craft production, with such traditional 
occupations as blacksmithing, hamessmaking, shoemaking and tinsmithing, was clearly 
distinguished from that of factory production, especially the large foundries , carriage 
factories and agricultural implement factories, and even from that of retail merchandising, 
a new and growing sector of the business community in the 1870s. (Table 4) 
The credit system in Brantford rested on an evaluation of wealth and prospects for 
business in the 1870s. No longer was good character a significant variable in obtaining 
credit. Like the Dun reporter, the Bank of Commerce's agent in Brantford, Thomas S. 
Shenston, investigated those criteria of importance to lenders. As Brant County Registrar 
and able to conduct title searches and consult court judgement registries, Shenston could 
provide the most complete financial information available at the time and this he did in detail 
with, he admitted, "plodding caution". 57 His favourable ratings addressed finances in the 
main. 58 Only negative reports raised character or life style as decisive factors. One busi-
nessman was dismissed curtly as a ''former farmer with some of the worst habits of the 
city". 59 Another, a builder and planning mill owner, lacked forcefulness, was judged weak 
because he "appear{ed] to have little control over his workmen. " 60 Personal qualities, then, 
could be liabilities, but seldom assets. By establishing a harder line in determining credit 
worthiness, both Dun's reporters and Shenston were acting implicitly on the assumption 
that individual effort and good intentions did not guarantee success in business. 
The contraction of credit and accompanying demands for tangible security rendered 
the management and finance of debt more difficult. Mortgages registered in the land records 
comprise the only complete set of data available for a systematic examination of debt over 
time, and while these data cannot be related to other forms of debt, it is clear that mortgages 
did become a fact of business life with the transition to industrial capitalism. They for-
malized credit relationships and were a mechanism of fixed capital formation. Mortgages, 
then, became one strategy to sustain viable enterprises at a time of structural change and, 
consequently, more businessmen were indebted, and to a greater extent, in the industrial 
than in the commercial economy. 
56. DUN, pp. 52A, 68, 114. 
57. Metropolitan Toronto Library, Thomas S. Shenston Papers, Lenerbook, Shenston to James Pollack, 
15 Sept. 1876, p. 301. 
58. Ibid., "Re: Alfred Watts" , pp. 714-20. 
59. Ibid., " Re: John Whiting, Sen' r," p. 503. 
60. Ibid., "Re: James Tun," p. 171. 
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Table4 Number of Selected Occupations Receiving Negative Credit Ratings, 1851-1881 
1850-1 1861 1871 1880-1 
Industry: 
Blacksmiths ..... .. .... . I of I 2of2 2of4 7 of II 
Founders ...... .. . .... . Oof2 I of5 Oof3 Oof3 
Jewelers . . . . ... . . ..... Oof I 2of5 2of5 3 of7 
Millers ... . ...... .. ... I of2 Oof4 Oof5 
Saddlers .. . . .. .... ... . Oof2 I of4 3 of5 4of7 
Shoemakers . . . .. ... ... . Oof I 6of 10 8 of 12 7 of 13 
Bakers/Confectioners .... I of3 I of5 3 of 10 
Brewers/Distillers . . ... . . Oof3 Oof I Oof I 
Builders/Contractors ..... I of I 3 of8 7of21 
Cabinet makers ... ..... . 4of4 Oof3 Oof I 
Carriage makers .. . .... . 2of3 Oof4 I of5 
Hatters ........... . ... I of2 Oof2 Oof2 
Tailors .. ... . .... .... .. 2of4 2of3 3 of5 
Tanners .... . .. ... .... . Oof3 I of4 Oof2 
Agri . implement rnfrs . . . . Oof2 Oof3 
Tinsmiths . . ..... ...... 3 of5 3 of6 
Painters ......... .... .. Oofl 2of7 
All industry .. .. . .... 23.1% 52.1% 30.5% 36.1% 
Commerce: 
Druggists ..... . . . . . . . . . 2of2 Oof3 Oof4 4of 10 
Forwaniers ..... .. . . . . . I of2 
General merchants ....... 7of 17 2of6 Oofl Oof I 
Grocers ... .. .. ........ 3of4 15 of26 22 of47 20of58 
Haniware merchants . . .. . Oof I Oof3 Oof3 Oof3 
Booksellers ..... . . . ... . 3 of3 2of2 2of4 
Dry goods merchants . . ... 3 of 12 I ofiO 2of8 
Grnin merchants ... .. ... 2 of2 I of3 I of2 
Hotel/ inn keepers . . . . . . . 3of4 4of 16 7of23 
Tavern/saloon keepers . .. . 3of4 4of9 I of5 
Liquor merchants .. .. ... 2of2 2of2 I of2 
Clothiers ......... . .. . . 2of3 I of2 
Produce merchants . . .... Oof3 Oofl 
Coal/wood merchants . . .. Oof3 3 of8 
Barbers ... ..... . .. . ... . .. Oofl 3 of5 
Furniture merchants ...... Oofl 3 of5 
Insurance agents . . . . . . . . I of I I of5 
All commerce ....... 48.1% 54.8% 34.8% 28.5% 
Businessmen in the commercial economy were not an overly indebted class. 61 The 
majority in 1851, fifty-two per cent, owned real estate free from mortgage debt. Less than 
twenty per cent of all businessmen, only about one quarter of property owners, had mort-
gages against their holdings. Similarly, seven of the ten businessmen who became property 
owners between 1851 and 1861 were able to do so without assuming a mortgage. Few, 
61 . David P. Gagan's study of mortgaging in Toronto Gore Twp. has indicated that about one third 
of rural property owners bore indebtedness. His conclusion that ''plainly, this was not a society of chronic debtors'' 
might apply with somewhat more force to urban businessmen, who were even less indebted. ''The Security of 
Land: Mortgaging in Toronto Gore Township, 1835-1885," in Aspects of Nineteenth-Century Ontario: Essays 
Presented to James J. Talman , eds. F.H. Armstrong, J.D. Wilson, H.A. Stevenson (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1974), p. 137. 
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it would seem, desired, or found it necessary to compromise their independence by as-
suming indebtedness of this form. 62 
Debt in the commercial economy was relatively concentrated at the extremes of the 
business population, among the wealthiest and the poorest, and among the youngest 
members. (Tables 5 and 6) Among the wealthiest ten per cent of the business class were 
Brantford's "boomers" and speculators. In most cases this indebtedness- amounting 
to sixty per cent of the mortgage obligations of all businessmen in 1851 - encumbered 
vacant land and often supported speculative activities that were tangential to primary 
business concerns. 
TableS Index of Relative Mortgage Debt by Economic Rank, 1851-1881 
Economic Rank 1851-2 1861 1871 1881-1 
0-39 percentile . . . . 616 694 295 86 
40-79 .. ".".". 34 73 175 94 
80-89 . " . " . . .. . 57 62 54 119 
90-100" . .. . . ... 121 102 66 96 
All "" .. . 100 100 100 100 
Source: AO, RG 22, Brantford, Abstract Index to Deeds; Assessment Rolls . 
Note: Relative mortgage indebtedness was calculated by dividing the percentage of mortgage debt owed by each 
group by the percentage of real wealth held by each group. The product of this was multiplied by 100 to create 
an index number which was less than 100 when the group was less indebted than the average in relation to the 
amount of wealth it held and more than 100 when relatively more indebted. 
Table6 Index of Relative Mortgage Debt by Age Group, 1851-1881 
Age Group 1851-2 1861 1871 1880-1 
20-29 years . . . . 401 72 129 526 
30-39 .. ...... 110 185 249 99 
40-49 " . . . .. . 29 61 74 107 
50-59 " " . " . 30 46 45 54 
60plus ..... . . 0 19 75 93 
All .. .. 100 100 100 100 
Source: PAC, Manuscript Census Schedules, Brantford, 1852, 1861 , 1871, 1881 ; Abstract Index to Deeds. 
For the poorest businessmen, as for those under the age of thirty, self-employment 
and property ownership was a strain and debt a mark of their marginality and recent em-
barkation in business. Yet, relative indebtedness in 1851 and 1861 diminished steadily from 
age cohort to age cohort, especially after the age of forty years, and in the middle range 
of the distribution of wealth. Nor did the assumption of indebtedness play a permanent role 
in the strategy of those pursuing success in the 1850s: greater indebtedness was associated 
with declining fortunes. Of those who grew wealthier between 1851 and 1861, only one 
62. Michael B. Katz, Michael J. Doucet, and Marie J. Stem. The Social Organization of Early Industrial 
Capitalism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982), pp. 132, 144, 156. 
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third became more indebted, whereas fifty-four per cent of those who maintained their 
wealth and nearly ninety per cent of those who lost wealth owed greater mortgage debt. 
(Table 7) The greater indebtedness of those who maintained or lost wealth reflected the 
lengths to which they had to go in order to stay in business. For some businessmen land 
was a savings bank and mortgages were withdrawals from their accounts. With time and 
business longevity, then, a man could hope to reduce his obligations and the qualifications 
to his independence. 
Table7 Mobility and Mortgage Debt, 1851-1881 
Mobility Percent Increasing Mortgage Debt 
1851-61 1871-81 1871-81 
Up . .. . . . 35 .6 44.2 48.6 
Stable . . . . 54.5 42.3 30.2 
Down .. . . 88 .9 36.7 45 .0 
All 45.5 41.7 42.2 
Note: This study has defined mobility in relative terms: those businessmen who rose to a higher decile in the 
distribution of wealth within the business population were defined as being upwardly mobile. Conversely those 
who fell to a lower decile were considered downwardly mobile . 
This situation changed after the crash of 1857. The rate of property ownership fell, 
and mortgage indebtedness grew so that half of land owners in 1861 and three-fifths in 1871 
carried mortgages against their property. The total value of their mortgages tripled from 
eighty thousand dollars to a quarter of a million dollars. Significantly, more men were 
obligated for smaller sums suggesting that the threshold of creditor tolerance had been 
lowered and that the strain of sustaining self-employment forced men to utilize all their 
assets. (Table 8) Moreover, its concentration shifted. Most affected were men who earlier 
had avoided indebtedness, those in the middle range of the distribution of wealth, men in 
their thirties and forties, and craft producers. Absolutely and in relation to the value of their 
real estate, the indebtedness of men in the middle range of the distribution of wealth -
in the fortieth to the seventy-ninth percentile- rose dramatically. In 1851 they had been 
responsible for just ten per cent of all debt and eighteen per cent in 1861 , but by 1871 they 
owed fifty per cent. Similarly, debt entangled more and more tradesmen as the rate of in-
debtedness in the industrial sector rose from twenty-two per cent of real property owners 
in 1851 to fifty-nine per cent in 1861. Moreover, on the average this indebtedness was for 
small amounts. These were the men who had typified the ideal of the independent men, 
married with a family and self-employed in a small but solid way. 
TableS Mortgage Indebtedness of Businessmen, 1851-1880 
1851-2 1861 1871 1880-1 
Average mortgage debt($) ... 2,253 2,724 2,132 3,830 
Median mortgage debt ($) . .. 1,020 860 1,000 2,000 
Total mortgage debt($) . . .. . 81 ,120 250,640 253,800 398 ,380 
Property owners in debt(%) . . 26.5 51.1 58.6 48.4 
Businessmen in debt (%) .. . . 18.8 30.0 35 .3 29.3 
N of debtors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 92 119 104 
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For them, no longer was mortgage debt a temporary condition associated with en-
trance to and early years in business. Rather it became a necessity for staying in business. 
Indeed, the relationship between debt and business longevity - defined as persistent self-
employment for more than ten years - changed with industrialization. In the 1860s and 
1870s mortgage debtors had higher rates of persistence in business than in the 1850s and 
were more likely to remain in business for ten years than were the owners of unencumbered 
real estate. (Table 9) Moreover, for advancement all of a man's assets had to be in play 
and at risk. By 1880 nearly half of the self -employed property owners who grew wealthier 
fell deeper in debt. On the other hand, those property owners who lost money in business 
were less likely than they had been in the 1850s to go deeper into debt and more likely to 
give up their real estate. Thus, land was increasingly another form of business capital rather 
than a repository for business profits. 
Table9 
Debtors ...... . 
Non-debtors ... . 
All .... . 
Rates ofPersistance in Business for Mortgage Indebted and Unindebted Property 
Owners, 1851-1881 (in per cent) 
1851-61 
44.4 
49.0 
47.8 
1861-71 
60.0 
43 .0 
50.3 
1871-81 
60.8 
52 .3 
56.5 
Mortgages appeared more important as instruments of capital formation in the 1870s. 
Despite a decline of ten per cent in the relative size of the indebted business population to 
just under half of all property owners, total indebtedness grew by fifty-seven per cent from 
1871 to 1881 to nearly four hundred thousand dollars. Two factors produced this: first, the 
use of mortgages to finance factory expansion; and second, the doubling of commercial 
debt. (Table 10) In both instances, this was due to larger mortgages being carried by the 
wealthiest businessmen. More than half of the total mortgage debt was owed by the 
wealthiest ten per cent. This was not a return to the pattern of the 1850s, however, since 
borrowing does not appear to have accompanied significant speculation. 
Table 10 
Economic sector 
Industry ..... . 
Conunerce ... . 
Value of Mortgage Debt by Economic Sector, 1851-1881 (in Dollars) 
1851-2 
50,640 
30,480 
1861 
163,630 
87,010 
1871 
150,560 
91 ,840 
1880-1 
206,440 
191,940 
The industrial sector always bore more of the mortgage debt of the business pop-
ulation. Yet, in the commercial economy the increase in the amount of mortgage debt did 
not finance the growth of existing industries, rather it supported more industries. Busi-
nessmen in the largest industrial enterprises bore less average debt in 1861 than in 1851. 
(Table 11) The total debt of the iron founding industry increased from forty-four thousand 
to sixty-eight thousand dollars over these ten years, while the average debt of iron founders 
declined from twenty-two hundred dollars to fourteen hundred dollars . In the industrial 
economy, debt financed the expansion of existing productive capacity. The average debt 
of carriage makers rose from only four hundred dollars in 1861 to nearly fourteen thousand 
in 1871 and five thousand in 1881. Their ability to carry this amount of debt and to retire 
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nearly two- thirds of it suggested the profits that could be realized by increasing the scale 
of production. Likewise, the mortgage debt of the average iron founder increased from 
fourteen hundred dollars in 1861 to six thousand in 1871 to twelve thousand in 1881 . In 
total, the mortgage debt of those engaged in production in Brantford in 1881 equalled about 
twenty per cent of all capital invested in manufacturing. 
Tablell Average Value of Mortgage Debt by Selected Occupations, 1851-1881 (in DoUars) 
Occupation 
Industry: 
Builder/contractor . . . .. . 
Carpenter . . . . . ... .. . . 
Miller . ...... . .. .. .. . 
Iron founder . . . . . . . . . . 
Shoemaker . . .. . . . .. . . 
Carriage maker . . . . . . . . 
Blacksmith .. .. . . . .. . . 
Tinsmith . . .. .. ... . .. . 
Tanner .. .. .. . . . . .. . . 
Haner . . ... ... ...... . 
Painter ..... . .... . . . . 
Jeweler/watchmaker ... . 
Commerce: 
Grocer ... ..... . .. . . . 
Druggist .. . ....... . . . 
Hotel keeper ....... . . . 
Tavern keeper . .. ... . . . 
Boardinghouse keeper .. . 
Dry goods merchant ... . 
Insurance agent . . . . . . . . 
Auctioneer . . ... . . . . .. 
Grain merchant ....... . 
Milk dealer .... . .... . . 
1851-2 
680 
600 
8,280 
2,200 
350 
1,080 
1,200 
904 
160 
96 
160 
1861 
730 
554 
140 
1,352 
600 
405 
900 
3,000 
870 
1,800 
1,563 
3,221 
140 
2,588 
250 
700 
3,621 
1871 1880-1 
1,464 2,031 
590 760 
3,063 9,970 
6,388 11 ,940 
630 450 
13,888 4,950 
890 
1,467 
2,480 2,550 
1,150 
445 3,324 
5,700 
1,831 3,480 
1,975 
783 6,876 
3,090 
1,633 
2,174 6,517 
775 3,400 
950 3,280 
450 3,010 
985 490 
Mortgages were similarly a mechanism of capital formation in the commercial sector. 
They financed the expansion of distributive capacity and office space and secured the 
consignment of inventories. The very rapid increase in commercial debt, which doubled 
from 1871 to 1881 , ought to be interpreted in conjunction with the enhanced credit ratings 
of men in commercial enterprises as an indication of the structural change in business. 
Commerce was, in terms of numbers of new businesses at least, the new growth area of 
business opportunity. During the 1870s- at the same time as industrial enterprises were 
declining in number by attrition - the commercial sector was growing at a more rapid rate 
than the city's population. Untill871 more than half of all businessmen were engaged in 
industrial production; but by 1881 sixty per cent were in commercial or service businesses. 
New and more specialized kinds of commercial ventures, many involving the retail or 
wholesale of goods factory produced in Brantford, accounted for one quarter of all, and 
one half of the commercial, enterprises opened in the 1870s. The result was that by 1881 
the retail merchant had displaced the craft producer as the typical Brantford small 
businessman. 
By the 1870s, then, mortgage indebtedness was a fact of business life. It provided 
not only the security that was essential for credit, but it also mobilized capital for investment 
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in the expansion of both industrial and commercial enterprises. Moreover, debt ceased to 
be associated as in the corrunercial economy with a temporarily compromised independence 
to be reduced with business longevity. In consequence, land, a rruuk of social respectability 
a short decade or so before, was rendered merely another commodity to be figured into 
the calculation of economic collateral. 
Increasing mortgage indebtedness in the 1870s marked the decline of the role model 
of the businessman that had typified the commercial economy. Self-employment and in-
dependence were not equivalent because of the necessity of indebtedness for a business 
career. With the transition to industrial capitalism, no longer was the businessman "the 
true man illustrating a particular condition in life'' and no longer was character consistent 
with that condition a significant criterion in obtaining credit. That such should ever have 
been the case may seem somewhat romantic. But, as E.P. Thompson has cautioned, "it 
is difficult to imagine the moral assumptions of another social configuration." It is too easy 
to impute calculations of business rationality in the strict economic terms we now expect 
of entrepreneurs to men whose moral assumptions rested on a different firmament. Not 
only did "the new political economy of the free market", as Thompson has argued, 
"breakdown the old moral economy of provision" 63 , it also supplanted the values of petty 
enterprise. These values comprised another moral economy, a system of socialized in-
divjdualism, in which character, responsibility and independence could be sustained and 
translated into self-employment through mutual self-help. 
Acceptance of this morality by merchants and credit agencies when dealing with petty 
enterprise and to varying degrees with mercantile enterprise demonstrated one side of what 
Elizabeth Fox-Genovese and Eugene Genovese have termed the "Janus face of merchant 
capital": its tendency to accommodate to existing social relations. Its other side, "the 
transformative abilities of exchange relations'', appeared in the contraction of credit through 
the 1860s and 1870s. 64 The inability of the petty proprietor to stay in business was a con-
dition necessary for the transition to industrial capitalism. It may of course be attributed 
to a number of factors, but not the least was the reluctance to credit him. That he had not 
been so disadvantaged in the past reveals that change involved an element of discretion. 
The irony, of course, was that the collapse of the commercial economy after 1857 could 
be attributed more to the unexpected failure of the major merchants and their various pro-
motions than to the misfortunes of the employed artisan and small shopkeeper. Yet, the 
latter, far more than the former suffered from the re-evaluation of risk in terms of pecuniary 
strength not character. 
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